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Abstract
The Tor Darknet is a pseudo-anonymous place to host content online frequently used by
criminals to sell narcotics and to distribute illicit material. Many studies have attempted
to estimate the size of the darknet, but this paper will show that previous estimates on
size are inaccurate due to hidden service lifecycle. The first examination of its kind
will be presented on the differences between short-lived and long-lived hidden services.
Finally, in light of a new Tor protocol for the darknet which will prevent the running
of relays to learning darknet sites, an analysis is presented of the use of crawling and
whether this is an effective mechanism to discover sites for law enforcement.
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1. Introduction
Tor is a tool for providing anonymity and privacy when using the Internet, developed
by the Tor Project. It does this by encapsulating the user’s traffic in layers of encryption
and routing it through three intermediate nodes (onion routers (ORs)) such that an
attacker cannot resolve all three of: source, destination and content at the same network
location [1]. In academic literature, this type of network is often called a mix network
and means that at the entry point to the network, the user’s identity is known but their
traffic is encrypted, and at the exit point their traffic is readable but their identity is
unknown.
The Tor Darknet is a feature that Tor provides where two nodes (e.g. a client and
a server) may communicate with each other without knowing each other’s identity. An
anonymous server, or hidden service, may offer any ordinary TCP-based Internet service.
A user wishing to contact a hidden service will first lookup information via a node (HSDir)
in a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) to find introduction points (IPs) which will relay a
message to the hidden service. The user will then ask the introduction nodes to relay a
message detailing a rendezvous point (RP) they have chosen at random, and both parties
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Figure 1: Hidden services network path
will build a three-hop circuit to it. As both the introduction points and the rendezvous
point have three intermediate hops between them and the user, and between them and
the server, neither knows the identity of each party. The hidden service and the user
are now connected via 6-hops through the rendezvous point, and so do not each other’s
identity (see Fig. 1).
Whilst many believe that Tor hidden services provide them with absolute anonymity,
the reality is that there are many long published deanonymization attacks which use
simple traffic correlation and do not require significant resources [2]. Additionally, law
enforcement and others have had success in targeting and locating criminals acting on
the darknet by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Tor software.
Whilst the Tor Project and other stakeholders frequently describe hidden services
as an example of privacy and anonymity for political dissidents, the academic literature
paints a considerably different picture where the majority of hidden services facilitate
criminal activity (e.g. child abuse and drugs) [3, 2]. Other authors have specifically
examined the political uses of Tor hidden services and concluded that much of the dis-
course is banal and of little interest to anyone [4]. Their analysis also concluded that the
unethical uses of Tor outweighed the ethical ones particularly due to the harm caused.
Given the criminally orientated content on the Tor darknet, many law enforcement
agencies and cyber-security firms have legitimate interests in crawling and collecting in-
formation on hidden services. Therefore, in this paper we set out to determine effective
strategies for studying the darknet with respect to crawling and monitoring hidden ser-
vices. One key issue is the size of the darknet, which we define as the total count of
concurrently available hidden services. We show that existing estimates of the darknet’s
size is a gross over-estimate and that crawling strategy can significantly affect results
obtained in any study. We also evaluate the impact of methodology on the estimation of
which services are available (e.g. by port) and the impact a new hidden service protocol
will have on scientific studies of the darknet.
2. Related Work
As described above, Tor uses a DHT to publish information used to contact hidden
services. The Tor DHT is similar in design to the Chord DHT [5] in that DHT participant
nodes are mapped onto a circle along with data for storage by use of a hash function.
In the case of Tor, it’s hash function H : X → {0, 1}160 is the SHA-1 pseudo-random
one-way function mapping the input set X to the set of bit strings of length 160. The
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use of a hash function exhibiting strong pseudo-random characteristics is important to
ensure even distribution around the circle (see Fig. 2). Each OR is mapped onto the
circle by using H (PKOR) where PKOR is the ASN.1 encoding of the OR’s public key.
Each of the Tor Hidden Services is mapped onto the circle by the use of a unique
descriptor ID as defined in equation 1, where P = H (PKonion) and P [a : b] denotes
bytes a through b − 1 of P , d is an optional descriptor cookie (shared secret) used to
provide client-side authentication for hidden services which are not accessible to all users.
Finally, r ∈ {0, 1}8 is defined as the replica value and may be 0 or 1. The replica value
provides a degree of redundancy, by hashing first with a value of 0, and then again
with a value of 1, it gives two distinct (with high probability) locations on the DHT for
publication of the descriptor (‖ denotes concatenation of bit-strings).
descid = H (P [0 : 10] ‖ H [tp ‖ d ‖ r]) (1)
The time period tp is defined in equation 2,given the time t in UNIX time (seconds
since 00:00 on 1st January 1970). The effect of this is that tp changes once per day in any
one of 256 intervals defined by the first byte of P . This ensures that all hidden services
do not attempt to change their publication servers at the same time.
tp =
⌊
t + P [0 : 1] · 86400256
86400
⌋
(2)
Each Hidden Service, after mapping all ORs and itself onto the DHT circle, publishes
its descriptor to the three ORs to the right of its descriptor-id on the DHT. As the Hidden
Service is mapped onto the circle at two locations, a total of six ORs receive a copy of
the descriptor. The Hidden Service publishes the text document by building a circuit to
each of the designated ORs and establishing a HTTP connection to its directory port.
Figure 2: Tor DHT
Due to the open-source nature of Tor, we are able to modify a Tor relay to log requests
for hidden services (e.g. visitors) and publications to build a list of hidden services. The
effect of the use of eq. 2 is that by running a number of static nodes, over time we will
observe the whole DHT.
Pustagarov [2] presented one of the first papers utilising information from the Tor
DHT to crawl hidden services and classify content. They collected a sample of hidden
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services present on a single day and were able to reach 60,000 hidden services. They then
used a bayes naive classifier to classify content into simple categories.
Owen & Savage [3] presented a more recent paper which collected data from the Tor
DHT over a period of six months during 2014 rather than a single day. They estimated
that there were approximately 45,000 hidden services at the time but that there was
considerable churn. They classified content manually to avoid classification errors and
found that the majority of content was criminal in nature. Notably, they found the
majority of visits to hidden services went to those hosting the most egregious content.
In early 2015, the Tor Project began publishing metrics from Tor relays to estimate
the number of hidden services that there were [6]. In the same way as Pustagarov, and
Owen and Savage, they record the total number of hidden services published to each relay
in a 24 hour period; however, to provide some obfuscation of the raw information they
applied additive noise following a laplace distribution. This data is then aggregated from
all of the relays and the noise averaged out, leaving a remaining error of approximately
±5% according to their simulations. The principle weakness with this approach, and
the subject of part of this paper is that the Tor Project record the cumulative total
of hidden services in any 24-hour period, rather than a point sample, and so it grossly
overestimates the number.
It is expected that shortly the Tor Project will deploy version 3 of the Hidden Services
protocol [7], whose principle goal is to prevent harvesting of hidden service addresses as
described above. We will examine the impact this will have on law enforcement and
academic studies in Section 5.
3. Measuring the darknet and darkweb size
In this section we seek to understand the true size of the darknet. Our hypothesis
is that many hidden services are short-lived, and therefore daily cumulative statistics on
the number of hidden services, such as those published by Tor [6], are an overestimate.
To obtain an exact measure to the number of hidden services, one would need to be
able to see all onions every day. This is not possible because we cannot observe the entire
Tor DHT without controlling all nodes. However, one can observe part of the DHT and
then extrapolate global figures. Sampling the DHT is made easier because of two Tor
design decisions. Firstly, hidden services publish to six places in the DHT, meaning one
relay observes as many as six times more publications than if a hidden service published
to just one place. Secondly, because the hidden service publishes to different parts of the
DHT each day, and this place is randomised by the use of a pseudo-random function,
one has a perfect randomised sampling mechanism. Therefore, it is reliable to make
generalisations about the larger population from a small sample.
To sample Tor onions, we run six relays over a period of six months. The relays
are configured to obtain the HSDir flag so that they will participate in the distributed
hash table for publication and requests for hidden services. The set of tests is as follows:
Upon publication, we immediately test the reachability of the onion and then port scan
it (n = 352). This is then repeated every two hours, recording the time from publication
to the up-test.
Recently the Tor Project have actively tried to stop study of the darknet in this way
and use a technique similar to honey onions [8, 9]. In this case, they publish honeypot
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Figure 3: Fraction of onions up following their publication
onions each day to selected sets of relays and see which get visited to identify those which
are harvesting data. This detection mechanism is trivially defeated, as described in the
original paper; however, deploying the technique in this paper would have adversely
affected accurate result correction.
The results for reachability some time after publication are shown in Figure 3. Sur-
prisingly we see a rapid fall off in the first few days of those onions which are reachable,
after which it enters a slow decline over time. Notably, after 24 hours following publica-
tion, fewer than half of the observed onions are reachable. Furthermore, approximately
30% are never reachable, that is, we were unable to connect to them at all. The reasons
for this are unclear, but if the server has an incorrect clock, then it will publish to in-
correct parts of the DHT thus making it unreachable. Alternative explanations are that
the onions are simply launched for a short test and then stopped.
Figure 4 shows a sample of hidden services and their reachability at particular points
in time. Every line on the Y axis represents one hidden service, and every pixel on the
X axis represents a two hour window. White indicates that the HS was reachable in
that window and black indicates that it was not. Immediately one can see that a large
number of HSes were not reachable for each point in time, but also there any a small
number which appear to go up and down. Crawling therefore cannot be a one-off event
because otherwise these services will be missed - it should be repeated as frequently as
possible.
It seems quite reasonable for those crawling the darknet using HSDirs as seeds to
find that the majority of onions are unreachable - this is not indicator of a failure in
methodology. Furthermore, we can say that the Tor metrics data [6] overestimates the
size of the darknet by a factor of two or more. This is because counting publications is
not sufficient to establish that an onion is up for the entire day or that it was reachable at
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Figure 4: Hidden Service reachability map (time = 25 days)
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all. Instead, we conclude that the Tor darknet is approximately half the size previously
thought.
4. Services on offer
Next, we study the types of services offered by Tor onions. Given evidence in [3] of a
large turnover in hidden services, we sought to understand more clearly the reasons for
the turnover. Whilst long-lived services have been studied many time, we are not aware
of any papers which have looked at those onions which are only up for a short period of
time.
To establish the services offered by a hidden service we test which ports are open.
We first fetch the descriptor then build a circuit to the hidden service and send a RE-
LAY BEGIN cell with a variety of destination ports, and observe the response. If the
circuit is closed or a rejection comes back then the port is closed, otherwise it is open. In
more recent versions of Tor, the circuit is closed on attempting an incorrect port which
considerably slows down port scanning (following a previous academic study [2]). Of
course, it is still possible to identify open and closed ports, but in our experience it took
around 24 hours to scan 10,000 of the possible 65535 ports for just one onion. Therefore,
we adopted an approach of scanning the most likely to be open ports which were deter-
mined through a combination of building a list on prior knowledge, collecting ports from
existing public/private darknet port scanners (by running hidden services and recording
ongoing scans taking place) and scanning a handful of hidden services in full. The final
list is as follows: 22 (ssh), 23 (telnet), 25 (smtp), 53 (dns), 80 (http), 81, 110 (pop3),
113 (ident), 135 (smb), 161, 443 (https), 445 (smb), 1337, 1433 (mssql), 3306 (mysql),
4444, 5222 (xmpp), 5223 (xmpp), 5901 (vnc), 6667 (irc), 6668 (irc), 6669 (irc), 6697 (irc),
8060 (onioncat), 8080, 8081, 8333 (bitcoin), 9051 (tor), 9200 (elasticsearch), 9500, 9878
(ricochet.im), 10000, 11009 (torchat), 15441 (zeronet), 17993, 22222, 27017 (mongodb)
and 31337.
We adopt the following two approaches to port scanning given that the previous
section showed that a large number of services were only active for a short period of
time.
1. Port-scan a hidden service as soon as we receive a publication at the HSDir.
2. Count those from the last point which were up less than 24 hours after publication.
3. Port-scan all hidden services learned which are up on a particular day - representing
a snapshot of the darknet at a particular point in time.
Table 1 shows the results of our port scans under these two scenarios. Interestingly,
web-based services make up the majority of hidden services in both cases, but Zeronet
is represented considerably more in the instant scan and those onions up less than 24
hours, indicating that these nodes tend to have a short life-span. Also noteworthy from
the results is the small number of ricochet.im (instant messaging) services seen, because
this is frequently cited anecdotally within the Tor community as being the cause of spikes
in the number of hidden services. SSH is also offered on a surprisingly large number of
services which is likely due to one of two reasons: 1) operators are using Tor to access
their servers anonymously to decrease the risk of identification; or 2) many users are
using Tor to punch through firewalls to access infrastructure. Some Tor hosting providers
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Port On-publication Snapshot Up < 24hr
22 (ssh) 12.1% 10.59% -
23 (Telnet) 0.6% 0.09% -
25/110 (Mail) 1.1% 4.13% -
53 (DNS) - 0.05% -
80 (http) 54.6% 74.16% 51.4%
443 (https) 2.0% 3.61% -
IRC (all) 1.2% 1.36% -
3306 (MySQL) - 0.08% -
XMPP (all) - 1.36% -
8060 (OnionCat) - 0.89% -
8080 0.9% 0.41% -
8333 (Bitcoin) 0.3% 1.0% -
9878 (Riccochet) 1.1% 0.67% -
11009 (TorChat) - 0.37% -
15441 (Zeronet) 26.1% 0.77% 48.6%
Table 1: Port-scans of long-lived (n = 14972) and short-lived services (n = 352)
Port Min. tpd Max tpd Avg. tpd
22 2.6 17 6
80 2.1 17.2 5.5
15441 2.1 52.5 12.6
Table 2: Ports offered against state transitions per day (tpd)
launch two onions per service offered, one for the public facing component and one for
SSH remote access - reducing linkability, although there is some prior work on using ssh
keyscans to link services together [10].
We also look at differences between those Hidden Services which are frequently going
up and down against the more stable services. To do this, we calculate the number of
state transitions (from on to off and vice versus) and normalize them over time. For those
services which are online all of the time, they will have zero transitions. Those which
stay online for a short period of time and then disappear forever will have one transition,
whilst those that go up and down will have many more. To normalize this over time,
for each service, we divide its measured lifetime by the number of state transitions we
recorded to produce transitions per day (denoted tpd). We then assign this number to
the ports the service offered and present the data in Table 2. Only those hidden services
for which we observed sufficient state changes are included.
One can observe from the data that web, ssh and Zeronet account for most services
which exhibit frequent up and down behaviour. Notably however, Zeronet accounted for
considerably more of these services that the other two types, with up to 12 transitions
per day (e.g. disappearing for 6 periods).
In conclusion, we can say that a big contributor to the high turnover of hidden
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Seed Source Total onions Onions up Reachable Reachable (%)
Reddit 601 272 3047 44.6%
Hidden Wiki 1852 482 3038 44.5%
Combined 2240 580 3047 44.6%
Table 3: Learning seed onions from Reddit
services is Zeronet servers, another darknet which can use Tor to provide some anonymity.
Zeronet nodes seem to operate for a relatively short period of time.
5. Will we go dark?
When Tor hidden services publish to the DHT, they sign the documents with a key
which is represented by their domain name (xxxx.onion). It is due to this reason that
it is possible to harvest hidden service addresses at the DHT nodes. Tor announced
in January 2017 the imminent release of the version 3 Hidden Service protocol, which,
although not yet available as of November 2017 is in advanced stages on the project’s
github page. Version 3’s principle design goal is to use blind signatures [11] to sign
documents published to the HSDirs. There is no known way to take this signature and
reverse it into the key for the hidden service itself. The effect of this is to end the ability
to run HSDirs to harvest hidden service addresses to study the Tor darknet and the
principle mechanism of study will be through crawling from known seed sites. It is worth
noting however, that if one knows the hidden service address through another mechanism
though it will still be possible to derive the blinded key and so measure popularity at
the HSDir (by brute force searching).
Using a crawler to learn HS addresses will mean that those hidden services which
neither listed nor linked to will not be discoverable. This presents a problem for law
enforcement and introduces potential bias during any attempts to study the Tor darknet.
In this section, we examine the impact of not being able to learn all addresses will have.
To do this, we choose common start points and crawl the darknet, record which hidden
services we learn and then compare them with those learnt through the HSDirs.
We choose two common start points for building crawler seed lists: 1) reddit - a
popular discussion site; and, 2) Hidden Wiki - a popular starting point for those browsing
the Tor darknet. On Reddit, we targeted two sub-reddits known to be used extensively
by Tor users, /r/TOR and /r/onions, where we learn 601 unique onions. For the Hidden
Wiki, we crawled the most popular wiki in our dataset (hwikis25cffertqe.onion) and the
uncensored hidden wiki (mijps*****.onion), learning 1852 unique onions.
To evaluate the effectiveness of these two common sources as seed lists, we use them
to seed a crawl simulator. The simulator takes previously crawled data, and revisits
every onion reachable from following hyperlinks (and onion mentions) from the seed lists
above. The simulator recursively follows all links until we have reached the maximum
number of onions just as a crawler would.
The results are shown in Table 3. Just under half of the darkweb is reachable when
using common seed lists and a crawler. A key question is: the other half of any im-
portance? Of the remaining 3786 sites that the crawler did not reach, there were 1898
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unique sites. The most popular consisted of botnet command and control addresses, De-
bian OS clones and several child abuse sites. To evaluate their importance, we summed
the total number of requests going to sites reachable through the crawler vs those not.
The reachable sites accounted for 2,008,437 daily requests whilst the unreachable only
received 35,782 requests. Therefore, we can say that whilst using a crawler finds less
than half of those sites learnable through HSDirs, it finds the bulk of sites that users are
visiting (or 98% of activity).
Therefore, the move to the version 3 protocol will protect those who truly wish not
to be found, but with the exception of a few classes of sites, most wish to drive users
to their hidden service and will advertise it as widely as possible. There are exceptions
and unfortunately these are the most relevant for law enforcement: botnet command
and control and secretive child abuse communities. Botnet hidden services can be found
through traditional malware analysis channels however and one hopes that traditional
law enforcement intelligence techniques will prevail against abuse sites.
Finally, we ask if a researcher can skip the costly exercise of running HSDirs and
simply count mentions on reddit to estimate popularity. To evaluate this, we counted
the number of unique reddit pages that an onion was mentioned on and compared with
the number of requests seen at our HSDirs. Exactly 272 onions mentioned on reddit were
seen at our directories and hence we had a measure of their popularity. We calculated the
coefficient of determination between the number of mentions and the number of requests
at the HSDir which is R2 = 0.288. Therefore we can say that there is a weak correlation
but using the reddit measure alone is not sufficient to gauge popularity. For example,
the site with the most mentions on reddit was Facebook’s darknet onion; however, when
measured at the HSDir, a drugs market and a child abuse sites were most frequently
visited.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the darknet is smaller than previously believed:
about half the size. One reason for this is that the Tor Project count cumulative totals
of hidden services online in one day when in fact more than half of them disappear within
that day.
We found that HTTP was the most commonly offered service in the longer lived
onions, but for shorter-lived onions Zeronet was a notable component - an emerging
darknet. Also, riccochet.im plays very little part in the number of hidden services avail-
able despite common such statements within the Tor community.
Using traditional sources for lists of hidden services to seed a darknet crawler is
an effective means of understanding activity on the darknet, with reachable sites (from
a public seed list) accounting for 98% of visits. Whilst the introduction of the new
hidden service protocol will obscure the activity of those who do not publish their onion
anywhere, many activities require publication to attract users.
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